Abstract. We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner's dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.
Introduction
The basic foundation of modern game theory is mainly due to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Ref. 1), Nash (Ref. 2) . At the highest level, a game is actually a multiple decision maker problem. In these problems, there are several decision makers; for each decision maker, there is an associated objective function and some possible strategies. Possible objectives might be preference ranking of outcomes, stabilization, robustness, payoffs, costs, etc. In most cases, we deal with games whose objectives are payoffs or costs. In Cruz and Simaan (Ref. 3) , this kind of game is called cardinal game. In this paper, unless specified to the contrary, a game is a cardinal game.
If a cooperative game allows side payments (Ref. 4) , it is called a transferable utility (TU, Ref. 4) cooperative game, while the other branch is called nontransferable utility (NTU, Ref. 4) cooperative game. TU game theory is often used to analyze team games. It assumes that each player considers that all players are in an ideal team in which each player will pursue the maximum of the total team payoff (or the minimum of the total team cost) and later they might calculate their share of the total payoff according to some kind of agreement. In this paper, this is called 100% cooperative game. Noncooperative game theory assumes that players will care only about their own cost or payoff and do not want to harm or help other players. In this paper, this is called 100% noncooperative game or 100% selfish game. Zero-sum game theory assumes that, if a player's payoff increases, the sum of all other players' payoff should decrease with the same amount. This is called 100% adversarial game.
Game models that are 100% cooperative, 100% noncooperative, or 100% adversarial are called ideal game models. However, there are situations that are not characterized by these ideal game models. Instead, they are partly characterized as noncooperative games and partly characterized as cooperative games. One possible situation is that, among the players, there is an agreement about sharing payoffs, but the risk of violating this agreement cannot be ignored. Another situation is that, among the players, there is an agreement about sharing and this agreement will be abided by all players exactly, but in this agreement, there is a "to-be-determined item". This to-be-determined item can be viewed as "disagreement in agreement". Both of the two cases can arise in the real world, but they are not modeled using existing game theories.
If we apply existing game theory to these nonideal cases, we need to choose among the ideal models. No matter which ideal model we choose, we have to discard some information that we already know. If we choose a noncooperative game model, we discard the cooperation information part and vice versa. Sometimes, discarding information might lead to undesirable results. Is it possible to find new models to capture all known cooperative and noncooperative types of information, so that decision makers can analyze cases that are more realistic mathematically and make decisions objectively?
In this paper, we propose two new models to capture and utilize game information more accurately. It is anticipated that these two models can help decision makers make decisions rationally when the situations have elements of both cooperation and noncooperation. Existing TU cooperative game models and noncooperative game models will coincide with special cases of these two new models. Currently, the two new game models are only for 2-player situations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with problem formulation and analysis of the first new model. Section 3 deals with problem formulation and analysis for the second new model. Section 4 outlines possible applications. Section 5 is a theoretical extension for both Section 2 and Section 3. Section 6 contains the the conclusions.
For all the later sections, we assume that all the payoff functions are of the same scale and that all players know all the payoff functions.
Sharing Creditability Game
Cooperation might exist in many cases usually considered as noncooperative cases, because cooperation might be able to improve the payoff of each player. Suppose that two competing companies are in a market. If they can cooperate on some price baseline (this may be illegal in some situations and in Section 4 we will discuss how to prevent this), even if it is not 100% cooperation, each of them might get more profit than the payoff that each of them could get when there is totally noncooperation. However, as the prisoner's dilemma (Ref. 5) illustrates, although players might have a desire to cooperate, there is also risk of the other players' noncooperation.
Existing TU cooperative games assume that all players are perfectly honest and abide by the agreement. Thus, no risk is assumed that some player will violate the agreement. This assumption is very strong. Indeed, even if a lawful contract is signed, there is still some risk of violating the agreement and the noncooperation risk cannot be ignored. This risk leads to difficulties of modeling these situations as cooperative games. Current noncooperative game theory assumes that the players are 100% noncooperative and this is the other extreme.
For situations in which the noncooperation risk cannot be ignored, cooperation creditability might be involved. For example, there are cases in which only letters of intent are signed. The formal contracts between countries, such as oilproducing-limiting contracts among the oil-producing countries, are usually not easy to enforce perfectly.
Existing TU cooperative game deals only with situations in which each player has 100% cooperation creditability, while existing noncooperative game corresponds only to 0% cooperation creditability cases. In this section, a game model that can consider creditability that is between 0% and 100%" will be discussed. 
T to represent the payoffs for the two players, respectively. We start the analysis from a prisoner's dilemma example described in Fig. 1 . The two players try to maximize their payoffs.
Cell 1 is the noncooperative Nash solution, and cell 4 is the TU cooperative solution. Since for each player cell 4 is better than cell 1, both players have desires to avoid cell 1 and reach cell 4. However, at the same time, both players are worrying about the risk that the other player will choose strategy A. Suppose that, to help reach cell 4, both players promise each other that they will share the total payoff, which is the sum of the two players' payoffs, according to the following agreement:
where d is the index for an individual player and d = 1, 2. P ij d is called the original payoff of the dth player, P ij ds is called the shared payoff of the dth player, ij is the index of the 2-dimension game array. λ s is the proportion that player 1 should get from the total payoff P ij 1 + P ij 2 according to the sharing agreement. λ s could be any nonnegative value less than or equal to 1 and might be calculated via the Shapley value algorithm (Ref. 6) or Neuclous value algorithm (Ref. 7) according to the importance vector of the players.
The function r(x) is defined as
and it is known as the ramp function. The term r(P ij 1 − λ s (P ij 1 + P ij 2 )) is the side payment from player 1 to player 2; r(P ij 2 − (1 − λ s )(P ij 1 + P ij 2 )) is the side payment from player 2 to player 1. At any time, at most one of these two terms could be positive. 2 ). This implies that, if this agreement were executed perfectly, both players would try to maximize P ij 1 + P ij 2 according to their own interests and would reach cell 4. That is to say, this sharing agreement would be reasonable to induce cooperation and it would describe an ideal TU cooperative game.
Since both players understand that there might be possibilities of violating the agreement, they know that a more appropriate description of this actual game would be
where M 1 , M 2 are real random variables which take values from [0, 1] and with
If we take the mathematical expectation of (3a) and (3b), we get
All items in (4) have explicit physical/economical meanings.
) is the expectation of the amount that player 1 would give to player 2. Similarly, c 2 r(P ij
) is the expectation of the amount that player 2 would give to player 1. Obviously, existing TU cooperative game theory and noncooperative game theory will coincide with two special cases of c d 's. If c 1 = 0, c 2 = 0, (4) will be a set of ideal noncooperative equations. If c 1 = 1, c 2 = 1, (4) describes an ideal TU cooperative game. In addition, with any possible indices, E(P ij 1s ) + E(P ij 2s ) = P ij 1 + P ij 2 . This implies that SCTE is just an adjustment and does not distort the total payoffs of the original game array. Clearly, if we consider E(P ij 1s ) and E(P ij 2s ), for both players, the Nash solution calculated from the new game would be no worse than the strategies calculated via maxmin approach on the basis of the new game.
Players will use SCTE to construct a new game that considers noncooperation risk and cooperation benefit simultaneously, and then apply existing noncooperative game theory to analyze the new game. The whole procedure is called sharing creditability game strategy (SCGS). SCGA plus noncooperative game strategy will be called sharing creditability game (SCG). With SCGS, players could calculate the thresholds for the balance between risks and benefits. In applications, the two players might be two countries, two companies, two unmanned aerospace vehicles (UAV), etc.
Illustrative Example.
We use a simple example to illustrate the procedure for applying SCGS.
Example 2.1. For Figure 1 , suppose that c 1 = 0.8, c 2 = 1, λ s = 0.5. After applying SCTE, we have the new sharing creditability game array described in Figure 2 that will be analyzed by noncooperative game theory.
The new NASH solution is cell 4 and the players tend to choose strategy B as an equilibrium strategy. High creditability such as 0.8 and 1 could ensure that players would conclude that, if they cooperate in this game, the expectation of benefits would be higher than the risk expectation. If each player's creditability were so high, they would trust each other and cooperation would be more likely to be implemented.
However, if c 1 = 0.6, c 2 = 0.6, in SCGA cell 1 would still be the Nash solution. Both players would still choose strategy A. This is to say, sharing creditability at this level could not ensure that players would conclude that, if they cooperate in this game, the expectation of benefits would be higher than the risk expectation. As a result, they would be more likely to reach cell 1.
According to SCGS, if we want to ensure that cell 4 be reached as an equilibrium point, we could assume the c d 's to be unknown variables and solve If λ s = 0.5, this would results in
The inequalities in (6) would provide thresholds for the benefits/risks. Similarly, if we know the true values of the sharing creditability, we could calculate the threshold of λ s . Heretofore, decision makers might tend to approximate a game by a cooperative game as long as they think the relationship between the players is leaning toward cooperative. They may even know that, when the inducement for noncooperation is large, the threshold for modeling the game as cooperative game should be higher, but this instinctive approach is qualitative. The SCGS model quantitatively captures some of these qualitative features and it could provide quantitative thresholds. According to SCGS, a good relationship, which corresponds to sharing creditability larger than 0.5, is not always enough to lead to cooperation. For example, c 1 = c 2 = 0.99, which is good sharing creditability and often modeled by people intuitively as ideal 1, might be enough to lead to cooperation for an original game like Figure 1 . However, this kind of sharing creditability might not be enough to lead to cooperation for the same-logic original game described in Figure 3 . This implies that, instead of resorting to pure instincts, decision makers might analyze game situations case by case according to SCTE mathematically and quantitatively. . In our example, the last decision node is modified so that it is more suitable to illustrate the application of sharing creditability. In addition, in Romp's example, a small initial altruistic/irrational population or possibility needs to be assumed. We will see that the small-altruism assumption can be replaced by a small sharing creditability, which might be more meaningful and reasonable under some situations.
Sharing Creditability in the Centipede
Consider the centipede game described in Figure 4 . In this game, there are only four decision nodes and both players know this. The left number in the parentheses is the payoff of player 1, if he or she chooses this path (playing D), while the right number is for player 2. Each player wishes to maximize his or her own payoff. Player 1 can only make a decision at node 1 and node 3, and player 2 can only make a decision at node 2 and node 4.
At nodes 1, 2, 3, when a player chooses to play A, we describe the result as "the player will first share the current total payoff with the opponent and then experience a game update." For example, at node 1, if player 1 chooses A, both players' accounts will get 0.25 (suppose the sharing is half-and-half) and the game will continue. Before reaching node 2, the payoff in player 1's account decreases by 0.05 and the balance in player 2's account increases by 0.55. Thus, at these three nodes, if a player chooses path A, the game continues to the next node; if not, then the game ends. However, for a path A decision made at node 4, there will be sharing only and the game will end. If a player wants to choose path A, or equivalently is willing to share, even if he or she knows that there is no later and larger benefit, the player is called a cooperative player. If not, this player is called a noncooperative player.
We see that this game is very much like repeated prisoner's dilemmas and, at the same time, there is an almost exponentially increasing long-term inducement for cooperation (path A). If we assume complete information, a backward induction would show that a noncooperative player 1 would play D with 100% probability. This is the paradox of backward induction. The reason is that this game's number of nodes is finite and a player can always start from the last node to determine the strategy for previous nodes. Now, assume that this is a game with incomplete information. That is, each player only knows whether he or she is cooperative, not knowing whether the other player is cooperative. Assume that there is a small value of the initial sharing creditability estimation for each player in the sense that each player is a cooperative player. The initial sharing creditability estimation for both players, for example 0.1, might be from a general estimation about the sharing creditability of a population.
According to SCGS, this is not enough to ensure cooperation in node 1 if the game stops before node 2. However, with the increasing long-term cooperation inducement, even if each player is noncooperative, a sequential equilibrium that will cause player 1 to choose path A with 100% probability might be possible, if both players update their estimations about the other player's sharing creditability according to Bayes' theorem.
Suppose that two noncooperative players play the centipede game in Figure 4 . We analyze the case backward (from node 4 to node 1). We use c k j to represent the probability estimated by the other player that player k is cooperative. According to the assumption about incomplete information, since player 2 could not do anything before node 2 to affect sharing creditability, c This mixed strategy at node 3 would occur only when player 2 would have done something cooperative and improved its cooperation creditability. The threshold of the case that player 2 does cooperative action is when player 2 plays a mixed strategy at node 2 with some positive probability. Using Bayes' theorem, the required probability P 2 2 (D) could be calculated as c
and we would get 
According to the analysis for node 3, to let player 2 play a mixed strategy at node 2, P 
If we assume P 
This implies that, with an incomplete information assumption, although both players are noncooperative players, it would still be possible to reach a sequential equilibrium that player 1 would always play A even if the number of nodes were finite. The sequential equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5 . 
2.4. Discussion. To apply SCGS, the players construct a new game that considers the influences of cooperation and noncooperation simultaneously, and then make decisions according to the new game and existing noncooperative game theory. After the new game is constructed, the algorithm for determining equilibria is the same as the algorithm used for determining Nash equilibria in existing pure strategy or mixed strategy noncooperative game theory. In addition, it should be noted that sharing creditability in this paper is different from the credibility discussed by Schelling ( Ref. 11-12) .
Secondly, it might be difficult to get true values for the sharing creditability, but in many situations to solve the problem we do not need very accurate estimation. For example, for an OGA as in Figure 1 , suppose that the true values of both players' sharing creditability are 0.9. According to (6) 
Thirdly, the SCG model could help decision makers reduce subjectivity when they face cases with partial cooperation. This is because the SCG model isolates the subjective factor such that decision makers can focus on the specific subjective factors such as c d 's. Via SCGS, decision makers could calculate directly the expectations of side payments; thus, quantitative game analysis would be possible.
Finally, in many situations, the relationship among the players is symmetric or close-to-symmetric. This is because a good-creditability player may be reluctant to cooperate with a bad-creditability player. Generally, if we consider nonsymmetric cases, c 1 does not need to be the same as or equal to c 2 . In estimation problems, the difference between c 1 and c 2 might reflect the estimation errors from different estimators.
Bottomline Game Model
In this section, we consider situations in which there is a sharing agreement and the agreement would be exactly abided by both players, but in this agreement, there is a "to-be-determined" disagreement.
Formulation.
In applications, time, information, or desire for negotiation are often limited or temporarily bounded, resulting in unresolved disagreements at negotiation time. For example, we can suppose that player A and player B would enter a TU game described by Figure 1 . Both players want to cooperate and share the final total profit by paying side payments to each other, but each of them might ask for 2/3 of the total profits and they both insist that this requirement be met before the game starts. Although they both know that finally at least one of them should compromise, they could not make their desires exactly meet the other's desires at the current time.
The two players could refuse to cooperate and give up possible cooperation benefits. They could also choose to cooperate under an imperfect agreement with to-be-determined items first so that they would not miss the opportunity and leave further negotiation about those items later. Bottomline game theory, proposed in this section, could model these situations and calculate mathematical thresholds for the tradeoff between benefits and risks.
Suppose there is a 2-player agreement that would be abided by both players exactly for all designated items. Following the notation in Section 2. 
where r(x) is defined in (2) . ij is the index of the 2-dimension game array, λ Very similar to SCGS, players can use BLTE to construct a new game and then apply current noncooperative game theory to the new game. The whole procedure is called bottomline game strategy (BLGS). BLGA plus noncooperative game strategy will be called the bottomline game (BLG).
It would be helpful to clarify the physical meaning of equation set (11) . We first consider the equation for P The new game could help players check what they could get if there were no agreement yet on the to-be-determined part, thus it may help players make decisions of whether it would be worthwhile to cooperate first and leave the tobe-determined items later. If the two players cooperate first under an agreement in which (λ
) is the to-be-determined item, even if they both refuse to compromise any more, P 1b ij is the guaranteed payoff player 1 can get, and P 2b ij is the guaranteed payoff player 2 can get. Clearly, if we consider P 1b ij and P 2b ij , for both players, the Nash solution calculated from the new game will be no worse than the strategies calculated via the maxmin approach on the basis of the new game.
Similar to SCGS, it would be very easy to use the bottomline game model to calculate thresholds for "too greedy to cooperate". These thresholds could be useful quantitative guidelines for decision makers.
Illustrative Example.
Suppose that two players face a game array as described in Figure 1 . Suppose that, before the game starts, λ 1 = 11/20, λ 2 = 8/15. After applying BLTE, we get.
The new Nash solution is cell 4. This implies that the two players should not be scared by the risks of the other player's refusing to compromise. In other words, for this game, it is worthwhile to first cooperate and leave further negotiation later.
If λ 1 = 3/4, λ 2 = 4/5, the new Nash solution still reaches cell 1. This means the risk is very high and a disagreement of this extent might do severe harm to players. In other words, the two players would be too "greedy" and the risk caused by this disagreement would be too large to be covered by the cooperation benefits.
Potential Applications
Sharing creditability game and bottomline game models could be used to analyze and anticipate some nonideal game cases that would be missed by current game theories. Obviously, players could use known information about sharing creditability and desire factors to estimate the tradeoff between benefits and risks. Players might also use a repeated or dynamic procedure to adjust sharing creditability and desire factors.
Here, we discuss briefly some highly simplified potential military/engineering applications. The first example is for military/engineering situations. Suppose force A and force B are from country A and country B, respectively, and country A and country B are allies. This alliance wishes to attack force C, that is, from country C. Since agreements between countries are sometimes violated, although there is a chief commander (commander A, from country A) who is in charge of force A and force B simultaneously, force B still keeps its independence to a great extent and has a commander B. To defeat force C successfully, force A and force B need to attack force C simultaneously. Force C will put its defending focus in one unknown direction, which will be one of the two invading directions from force A and force B, such that the invading force from that direction will experience a huge loss. To induce cooperation, force A and force B may sign an agreement saying that the force that experiences a larger loss should receive assistance from the other. Since it is difficult to ensure the agreement to be executed perfectly, both the chief commander (commander A) and the other commander (commander B) may use SCGS to estimate the trade-off between benefits and risks. Another possible example is to replace countries with two UAV teams between which communications may be lost accidentally.
For potential socioeconomic applications, a simplified example might be as follows. Suppose there is a potential contractor (PC) G who has to select a subcontractor from two possible organizations, say D & E. For various different factors, D and E's proposals are not easy to be distinguished from each other and each of them has some possibility to win. D and E might set up an alliance privately to improve the demand price in each proposal by $1,000,000. In this case, the relative competition between D and E will not change, but G will give out 1 million dollars more.
In this case, G, D, E might all use the SCGS to estimate the benefits/risk tradeoff between the two applicants. They would estimate whether the cooperation between D&E would be promising enough and then select corresponding strategies. Similarly, G could be a government that would be worrying about a possible private price agreement between two big companies that might result in an illegal monopoly. By using SCGS, the government could estimate the risk that the private agreement would become a reality and then decide whether it would be necessary to make a stricter law and/or pay more attention to the two companies. SCGS would be helpful for the optimal allocation of government resources. Alternatively, we could envision G as a hotel chain near airports. The hotel chain might use a SCG model to estimate whether two competing airlines could cooperate to increase the number of passengers successfully so that he or she would need to expand the hotels.
A third simplified potential example is about BLGS. Suppose two countries, country X and country Y, both claim three islands between them, say island L, island M, island N. The two countries are fighting. Since the war costs too much and no country could get overwhelming advantage, both countries would have desires to stop the war and leave some islands as to-be-determined part. However, if only one country would choose to stop the war, it would definitely suffer. This might be viewed as a game similar to Figure 1 . Both countries know that it would be too difficult to solve all the disagreements about the three islands, but they might agree that each player would just take one island firmly and keep the third island neutral temporarily. In this situation, BLGS could be applied to calculate whether this kind of agreement would be worthwhile and acceptable. After applying BLGS, the new game might be as the game described in Figure 6 and the war could be stopped. Side payments in this game could be explained as follows. If one country occupied all three lands, it might propose to return one of them to calm down the people in the losing country and ask the losing country to accept this as a condition of stopping the war.
Theoretical Extensions
Theorem 5.1. In Wei and Cruz (Refs. 13, 14) , a coupling game model and theorems about the role of cooperation in coupling games are proposed. For the sharing creditability game and the bottomline game, since there are ramp functions that are not differentiable, it is difficult to apply similar procedures directly, to explore the role of cooperation. However, it is possible to introduce other formulas to model some cases close to the situations described by the creditability game and the bottomline game.
Suppose that there is a 2-player agreement that might not be honored by both players exactly, and before the game starts, player d asks for a proportion λ d of the sum of the two players' final payoffs. It is possible that λ a + λ b > 1. In addition, player d's sharing creditability is c d , which means that, when there is side payment from player d to the other player, the mathematical expectation of the actual transferred amount would be the product of the original amount and c d . Under such situations, both players need to decide whether they should postpone further negotiation and cooperate first, or simply refuse to cooperate and terminate the negotiation. We introduce formulas (12) to model such situations:
Equations (12) unify some cases that are close to sharing creditability game situations and bottomline game situations that we have discussed. They will be exactly the same when λ d and c d take some special values, but generally, they are not equivalent. (12) require more side payments than the old formulas stated in the sharing creditability and bottomline games. It might be suitable to describe a loose alliance in which a proportion of the payoffs of different players is given to a central administration and then the sum is reassigned to different players by the central administration. Games for such situations can be called loose-alliance games. According to different agreements and situations, players can choose formulas to model their cases.
If c a = c b = 1 and λ a + λ b > 1 hold simultaneously, (12) describe a bottomline game. If c a ≤ 1, c b ≤ 1, and λ a + λ b = 1 hold simultaneously, the equations describe a sharing creditability game. To deduce theorems about the role of cooperation for situations described by (12) , it is helpful to start with Theorem 2.1 in Wei and Cruz (Ref. 14) . We restate it in this paper as Theorem 5.1. 
and
hold simultaneously.
Then,
and the equality holds if and only if
We sketch a proof of Theorem 5.1 as follows. First, we apply a bivariate Taylor series expansion six times (at two different levels) for a small neighborhood. Then, we prove that, when the changes of coupling factors go to zero, the changes of the coordinates of the Nash equilibriums will also go to zero. Finally we prove that the conclusion is true not only in a neighborhood, but also in the whole region which is determined by 
Then, If c a 1 = 1 and λ a = 0, we will know that c a 2 = 1 and λ b = 1. This is a special case that player a will ask for nothing and sharing creditability is 1. In this case, (15) and (16) will both collapse into (17), 
and 
We still need to check whether w a 2 ≤ 1 and w
Since 0 ≤ λ a ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ c b 2 ≤ 1 hold simultaneously, the last line of (22) 
and Proof of Theorem 5.3. Applying a procedure similar to that in the proof of Theorem 5.2, it can be verified that conditions (b3) and (c3) satisfy (b1) and (c1). Except for the trivial cases that among λ 1 a , λ 2 a , λ 1 b , λ 2 b , some are zeroes, we need to show that 14) can be obtained using similar proofs. In addition, since addition and multiplication are related via the operator log, it is easy to obtain results similar to Theorem 4.1 in Wei and Cruz (Ref. 14) .
The theorems discussed in this section imply that, under some conditions a larger overall benefits can be guaranteed by better cooperation. This confirms the common sense that better cooperation often leads to better results. 
Conclusions
This paper proposes two flexible game models, SCG and BLG, to capture both cooperative and noncooperative aspects of situations. Using these models, decision makers could model and analyze some cases that could not be satisfactorily modeled or explained by current game theories, such as imperfect team cooperation among UAVs/troops/companies. In the transformed game framework, conventional noncooperative strategies are sought to provide Nash equilibrium points. However, the objective functions associated with the transformed game are not the original ones. The replacement of the original objective functions by these new objective functions is the key concept for capturing auxiliary information usually neglected in previous game theories. We have shown that previous models of cooperative and noncooperative games are special cases of SCG and BLG. Theorems that, under some conditions, better cooperation leads to better overall benefits are proved.
SCG and BLG models could have potential applications in military, engineering, and socioeconomic situations. Players could use them to estimate the tradeoff between benefits and risks of possible cooperation quantitatively, and then choose reasonable strategies. In addition, they could also be helpful for optimal resource allocation.
